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Abstract
Intuitive decision making has a large and often negative impact in economic
decisions, but its measurement and quantification remains challenging. Following
research from psychology, behavioral economists have often attempted to causally
manipulate the balance of intuition and deliberation by relying on experimental
manipulations as cognitive load. However, these attempts have resulted in mixed
success, with many null results and no clear general pattern. We explain the pos-
sible reasons behind these developments and offer avenues for improvement. First,
we show that a very simple formal model of decision processes offers a straightfor-
ward test to determine whether cognitive load has been successfully induced, hence
disentangling failed inductions and true null results. Specifically, cognitive load in
economically-relevant tasks must result in shorter response times. Second, we show
that the intuitive arguments on the behavioral implications of cognitive load do not
hold on closer, formal examination, unless strong assumptions are made that may or
may not hold in typical economic experiments. We then report on seven economic
experiments (joint N = 628) using different cognitive load manipulations and con-
firm the implications of the model. While the effect on response times is strong and
pervasive, behavioral effects are weak and elusive. Our research serves as a warning
on the differences between economic tasks and psychological experiments and the
difficulties associated with importing methods uncritically.
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1 Introduction
Human beings routinely rely on their intuition, even for complex decisions. Extensive
evidence from psychology shows that many human responses are based on impulses
and habits, and involve little or no deliberation (Kahneman, 2003, 2011). Economic
decisions are not an exception. Accordingly, the economics literature is paying increasing
attention to the role of intuition in a large variety of areas. For instance, it has been often
argued that self-control problems might be due to failures to inhibit intuitive reactions
(Baumeister et al., 1994; Bernheim and Rangel, 2004; Kaur et al., 2010). The impulse
to give in to immediate consumption might be behind intertemporal inconsistencies as
those captured by hyperbolic discounting (Thaler, 1981; Ainslie, 1992; Laibson, 1997).
These and other examples have given rise to a number of “dual-self” models (Thaler
and Shefrin, 1981; Bénabou and Tirole, 2002, 2003, 2004; Benhabib and Bisin, 2005;
Fudenberg and Levine, 2006, 2012), which reflect the view that economic behavior might
result from the interplay between intuition and deliberation.
The role of intuition has also been intensely discussed for a number of important
problems in interpersonal interactions. A large and heated debate has addressed whether
cooperative behavior can be considered intuitive or not (Rand et al., 2012; Tinghög et al.,
2013; Bouwmeester et al., 2017; Recalde et al., 2018). A similar debate has centered on
whether fairness or rather selfishness is the default (intuitive) mode of behavior (Piovesan
and Wengström, 2009; Fischbacher et al., 2013; Achtziger et al., 2016; Cappelen et al.,
2016; Andersen et al., 2018). Several works have investigated whether honest behavior
has an intrinsic value because dishonesty (and lying in particular) involves an active
inhibition of intuitive tendencies (Cappelen et al., 2013; Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi,
2013; Gneezy et al., 2018). The recognition of the importance of intuition might also
inform the design of behavioral interventions. For instance, Heller et al. (2017) designed
randomized controlled trials to help youth at risk of engaging in crime “slow down and
reflect on whether their automatic thoughts and behaviors are well suited to the situation
they are in.”
To study intuition and its consequences for economics, we need both correlational
and causal evidence. Research from psychology suggests that deliberative processes rely
on cognitive resources to a much larger extent than intuitive thinking (Baddeley and
Hitch, 1974; Baddeley, 1992). Thus, if those cognitive resources are taxed or impaired,
the balance between deliberation and intuition will be shifted toward the latter. This
is the essence of cognitive load manipulations that causally reduce the amount of cogni-
tive resources available for a task, hence impairing deliberation and boosting intuitive
behavior. An extensive literature has shown the effectiveness of these manipulations in
psychology (Baddeley et al., 1984; Shiv and Fedorikhin, 1999; Hinson et al., 2002; Lavie
and de Fockert, 2005; Barrouillet et al., 2007). This is important, because the shift
induced by cognitive load would be very consequential in many situations of interest in
economics. In terms of decisions and performance, intuitive processes often correspond
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to cognitive shortcuts or heuristics, which might be aligned with deliberation in some or
many situations, but might conflict with it, leading to biases, in economically relevant
domains as decision making under risk or uncertainty. Thus, tilting the balance toward
intuition allows to better understand such biases. In terms of preferences and motives,
this might reveal intrinsic tendencies (sometimes informally referred to as a “default
mode of behavior”), and hence a shift toward intuition might help uncover the roots of
many economically relevant human tendencies as altruism or cooperation.
It is hence not surprising that a large number of works in behavioral economics have
turned to cognitive load and related manipulations to causally influence reliance on intu-
ition. However, the literature has achieved limited success and generally obtained mixed
or null results. Cappelletti et al. (2011) found no effect of cognitive load on proposer
offers in an Ultimatum Game. Similarly, Cornelissen et al. (2011) found no effects in a
Dictator Game, although there was an interaction with Social Value Orientation (Mur-
phy et al., 2011). Hauge et al. (2016) reported finding small or nonexistent effects in a
series of Dictator Games. Benjamin et al. (2013) found no significant effects of cognitive
load on time preferences or selfish behavior. Glaser and Walther (2014) reported that
behavior in an investment task was unaffected by cognitive load. In a study on mixed-
strategy play in games, Duffy et al. (2016) obtained counterintuitive results of cognitive
load and concluded that the availability of cognitive resources might not affect behavior.
Allred et al. (2016) studied strategic sophistication under cognitive load and concluded
that the effects, if any, were inconsistent across games. Deck and Jahedi (2015) found
that cognitive load increases risk aversion and impatience over money, but has no effect
on impatience over consumption. Further, the effects are driven by the individuals most
sensitive to the manipulation. Drichoutis and Nayga (2020) reported finding no effects
of cognitive load on risk preferences or consistency of economic decisions.
Other studies, however, have found significant effects of cognitive load manipulations
in economic tasks, sometimes in contrast with the studies quoted above. Milinski and
Wedekind (1998) and Duffy and Smith (2014) found effects of cognitive load on behav-
ior in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma. Carpenter et al. (2013) provided evidence that
cognitive load impaired strategic sophistication in games. Døssing et al. (2017) found
increased cooperation under cognitive load in a repeated public good game. Schulz et al.
(2014) used a series of mini-Dictator games and found that subjects under cognitive
load react less to the degree of advantageous inequality. Samson and Kostyszyn (2015)
showed that cognitive load reduces trust in a Trust Game. van ’t Veer et al. (2014)
found that participants under cognitive load were more honest in the die-rolling task
of Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013). Buckert et al. (2017) documented increased
reliance on imitation under a manipulation closely related to cognitive load. Gerhardt
et al. (2016) find increased risk aversion in lottery choices under cognitive load.
Overall, the picture is a blurred one, with mixed and often non-significant effects. It
is also reasonable to assume that publication bias might have resulted in an additional
number of unsuccessful studies not being circulated. In view of this, some researchers
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have even argued that economic rationality might be unaffected by temporary impair-
ments in cognitive resources (Drichoutis and Nayga, 2020). Given the fact that cognitive
load is a well-established, non-controversial manipulation in psychology, this situation is
puzzling. In this work, we set out to provide answers to the puzzle and suggest avenues
for possible improvement.
For this purpose, we first provide a very simple formal model of decision processes
incorporating the postulated effects of cognitive load, namely that cognitive load tilts the
balance toward more intuitive processes and away from deliberative ones. This simple
model immediately delivers a useful prediction which can help improve future experi-
ments relying on cognitive load. The reason is that, if a given cognitive load experiment
finds no effect, it is not possible to conclude whether this is truly because a shift to
intuition does not affect economic behavior, or rather because the particular cognitive
load manipulation implemented has failed to tax cognitive resources to a sufficient ex-
tent. Our first prediction provides a manipulation check which allows to test whether the
manipulation has been successful or not independently of whether there are any effects
on behavior. Specifically, the model predicts that decisions under cognitive load must be
faster than in its absence. The intuition for this result is straightforward. One of the fun-
damental characteristics associated with more intuitive (or more automatic) processes is
that they are generally faster than more deliberative ones (Kahneman, 2003; Strack and
Deutsch, 2004; Evans, 2008; Weber and Johnson, 2009; Alós-Ferrer and Strack, 2014).
If a manipulation successfully induces a shift toward more intuitive processes, meaning
that decisions arise from those more often, average response times must become shorter.
However, while this effect will typically arise for economic tasks, we do not necessarily
expect to observe it in the kind of tasks characteristic of cognitive psychology. The rea-
son is that economics often deals in more complex decisions than psychology. Cognitive
load is bound to cause a small increase in response times due to the more mechanical
parts of decision making, e.g. those involved in perception, motor implementation, and
process selection. For very simple tasks involving very short response times, those me-
chanical effects might dominate, resulting in longer response times (Gevins et al., 1998;
Baddeley et al., 2001; de Fockert et al., 2001). For complex tasks as the ones of interest
to economists, those mechanical effects will typically be negligible and the effects we
describe here will dominate.
Our model allows us to critically examine the standard predictions ascribed to cog-
nitive load in economic experiments. Essentially, the argument is that, if cognitive load
induces a shift toward intuitive processes, a shift toward intuitive actions should result.
On close examination, this argument rests on additional and possibly unwarranted as-
sumptions. Again, for the simple tasks often used in cognitive psychology, processes are
often straightforward stimulus-response mappings with little variability, and an identifi-
cation between intuitive processes and intuitive actions might be unproblematic. For the
complex decisions economists are interested in, however, processes are closer to behav-
ioral rules, which depend on stimuli in a noisy way. It is simply not possible to conclude
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that a given action comes from a particular type of process without incurring in a reverse
inference fallacy (Krajbich et al., 2015). Further, even though theories of intuition and
deliberation often use those labels in a dichotomous way for simplicity, the underlying
dimension (automaticity) is actually viewed as a continuum in psychology (e.g., Allport,
1954; Schneider and Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin and Schneider, 1977; Bargh, 1989; Cohen
et al., 1990). That is, few processes are purely automatic (or intuitive), or, in other
words, many processes that an economist might view as intuitive are merely less deliber-
ative than others and rely less on cognitive resources than those. Thus, it is by no means
clear that, even if cognitive load shifts the balance toward more intuitive processes, those
processes will remain completely unchanged under impaired cognitive resources. In our
model, we incorporate natural assumptions on the how decision processes are affected
(be they more deliberative or more intuitive), and find that the standard predictions
regarding the effects of successfully-induced cognitive load on behavior fail to obtain.
Restoring them entails a strong, additional assumption which essentially boils down to
intuitive processes being completely unaffected by cognitive load.
After detailing the findings in our simple model, in this paper we report on seven
independent experiments (joint N = 628), using a variety of cognitive load manipulations
and different economic applications with reasonably-complex tasks (strategic interactions
in Cournot markets, voting decisions in small committees, and belief updating tasks). In
all experiments, we find robust effects of cognitive load on response times as predicted
by the model. Hence, we conclude that all our cognitive load manipulations successfully
induced process shifts as desired. However, effects on actual behavior are mixed and
often nonexistent.
In conclusion, we propose that economists using cognitive load in future experiments
deploy the response times test we provide here as a manipulation check, in order to be
able to argue that their manipulation had the desired effect of inducing a shift toward
intuition. At the same time, researchers should be aware of the fact that uncritically
importing arguments from psychology on the actual effect on behavior might be unwar-
ranted, and generally rests on strong assumptions on the nature of the involved intuitive
processes. This is not to say that researchers in economics should abandon cognitive
load entirely, but merely that the nature of the assumptions on underlying processes
should be made clear, and their validity should be investigated.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of
the psychological theories behind cognitive load manipulations. Section 3 spells out our
formal model. Section 4 presents three experiments on strategic behavior in Cournot
markets. Section 5 discusses three experiments with different voting rules in commit-
tees. Section 6 presents an experiment on belief updating with two different cognitive
load manipulations. Section 7 discusses the results and presents suggestions for future
research.
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2 Working Memory and Cognitive Load
Understanding cognitive load manipulations requires a discussion of working memory,
which can be described as the set of functions and resources governing the selection and
execution of decision processes. To understand the origins of cognitive load manipula-
tions, we briefly introduce the working memory model of Baddeley (1986, 1992, 1996,
2000), which is a standard reference in cognitive psychology. This model describes how
different working memory components might be responsible for automatic and controlled
processes and their selection. It suggests a supervisory system that controls the switch
between processes. The model distinguishes a central executive system from several sub-
ordinate memory systems (components) that are modality-specific. These components
are the phonological loop, the visuospatial sketchpad, and the episodic buffer. Each of
the working memory components has only limited (cognitive) capacity. Accordingly,
cognitive load manipulations work by overloading these components’ resources.
The phonological loop, also known as verbal working memory, is responsible for the
retention of verbally coded material, independently of whether it is presented in writ-
ten or auditory form. It refreshes stored information through inner-voice repetition or
subvocalization (see, e.g., Gathercole and Baddeley, 1993). The assumption is that the
cognitive resources required by the phonological loop are used more intensely by more
controlled processes. Most of the cognitive load manipulations employed in previous
economic research target the phonological loop (typically, keeping certain numbers in
memory), and accordingly, so did several of our manipulations. The visuospatial sketch-
pad is responsible for the retention of graphically coded material, as e.g. images. Some
cognitive load manipulations in psychology avoid the phonological loop and target this
subsystem instead by, e.g., asking participants to keep a configuration of dots in memory.
One of our experiments in Section 5 included a manipulation of this type. The episodic
buffer is the most-recent addition to working memory theory (Baddeley, 2000), and is
assumed to be responsible for the temporary storage and manipulation retrieved from
long-term episodic memory.
Last, the central executive integrates information from various sources and is also
seen as the supervisor or controller of the other working memory components, consum-
ing a large part of the cognitive resources associated with working memory (Norman and
Shallice, 1986). It plays the role of a supervisory system switching between controlled
and automatic processes. More generally, it is assumed to govern the controlled selection
or development of strategies in situations which are new in the sense that no specific
rules have yet be learned, i.e. when automatic processes are not available. It is also
responsible for allocating attention to complex controlled processes and implementing
them. Hence, successfully performing complex cognitive tasks (e.g. by inhibiting auto-
matic processes) can be assumed to rely on functions of the central executive. Cognitive
load manipulations targeting the central executive are seen as particularly demanding.
The experiment in Section 6 included a manipulation of this type.
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3 A Simple Formal Model
The model builds upon previous models incorporating multiple behavioral rules, but
extends them to incorporate cognitive load (Achtziger and Alós-Ferrer, 2014; Alós-Ferrer,
2018; Alós-Ferrer and Ritschel, 2020). It assumes that two behavioral rules codetermine
behavior, a more deliberative one and a more intuitive/impulsive one. In this manuscript,
we present multiple experiments in different settings involving different behavioral rules.
3.1 The Basic Model
Consider a given decision problem, where a decision maker has received some information
on the available alternatives. On the basis of possibly-different parts of that information,
different behavioral rules deliver prescriptions. Suppose further that only finitely many
options are available (as will be the case in the experiments). Denote by X the finite
set of options, with typical element x ∈ X.
In any cognitive load experiment, the researcher will have some candidate for delib-
erative and intuitive behavior. Let D and I denote the more deliberative/controlled and
more intuitive/impulsive behavioral rules, respectively, and let xD denote the delibera-
tive and xI the intuitive choice. However, behavior is noisy, and hence we assume that all
rules are stochastic in nature, i.e., they carry an amount of noise, resulting in deviations
from the rule’s prescription. Note that, hence, the deliberative rule can select xI and
the intuitive one can select xD, and any of them could select actions x 6= xD, xI . That
is, xD is the option most frequently selected by the deliberative process and xI is the
option most frequently selected by the intuitive process, but the processes themselves are
noisy. If PD(x) > 0 and P I(x) > 0 denote the probabilities with which each rule selects
x ∈ X, conditional on the rule being the one which actually determines the response,
then PD = PD(xD) is the probability with which the deliberative rule indeed selects
the deliberative choice, and P I = P I(xI) is the probability with which the intuitive rule
selects the intuitive alternative. By definition of xD and xI , and assuming no knife-edge
ties, one has that, for each decision situation, PD > PD(x) for all x ∈ X,x 6= xD and
P I > P I(x) for all x ∈ X,x 6= xI . That is, the prescription of a rule (xD or xI) is the
rule’s most frequent (modal) selection, but in the multi-alternative case this does not
even imply that the prescription is selected more than half of the time.
If a researcher has decided to implement a cognitive load manipulation, it will be
because he or she wants to make use of the fact that cognitive load induces a shift in
(unobservable) decision processes. To formalize this assumption, we adopt the view that
which of the two rules will actually determine behavior is a stochastic event. Let Δ > 0
be the probability that the actual response is selected according to the more intuitive
rule (or, alternatively, the latter is not inhibited by the central executive in favor of more
deliberative ones), and 1 − Δ the probability that it is selected according to the more
deliberative one. The parameter Δ thus reflects the balance between more intuitive
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and more deliberative processes. The essence of cognitive load is hence captured by the
following assumption.
(L) Δ increases under cognitive load.
Response times are also assumed to be stochastic. Let RD = E[RT |D] and RI =
E[RT |I] denote the expected response times conditional on the response being selected
by the more deliberative or the more intuitive rule, respectively. For simplicity, we
assume that expected response times do not depend on the actually-selected response.
Naturally, since the more automatic rule is thought to be faster in expected terms, we
assume
(R) RD > RI .
For some of the results below, we will further assume that
(P) P I > PD,
i.e. the deliberative process is noisier than the impulsive/automatic one, while the latter
is more consistent. This is natural since automatic processes are assumed to rely more
strongly on associative stimulus-response patterns. A simple way to think of the model
is to conceive of the intuitive rule as a swift cognitive shortcut, while the deliberative
rule is a slow, deliberative process which depends on actual computations and is hence
more error-prone.1
The model described so far encompasses the one in Achtziger and Alós-Ferrer (2014),
which however was restricted to binary choices, and extends it to include cognitive load.
Assumptions (R) and (P) have been given a micro-foundation in Alós-Ferrer (2018),
where the behavioral rules are instantiated as diffusion processes as in the drift-diffusion
model (DDM) of Ratcliff (1978) and Ratcliff and Rouder (1998), which has been recently
further analyzed by Fudenberg et al. (2018) and is standard in cognitive psychology and
neuroscience (e.g. Shadlen and Shohamy, 2016). In this model, evidence accumulation
(internal to the decision maker) is captured as a diffusion process with a trend µ and two
barriers. Whether the process chooses an option or the other corresponds to whether
the upper or the lower barrier is hit first. The response time is the time at which the
first barrier is hit. Alós-Ferrer (2018) shows that assumptions (R) and (P) above follow
immediately if one assumes that the drift rate of the more automatic process is larger in
absolute value than the drift rate of the more deliberative process, which in turn simply
captures that the former is swifter than the latter.
It is important to emphasize that the response time of a given behavioral rule can
never be actually observed, because any given choice (even if it is the choice most likely
selected by a given rule) might originate from any behavioral rule. Thus, predictions can
not rely on an assignment of choices to rules without falling prey to a reverse inference
1Here “error” just means a response other than the one prescribed more often by the rule, and it is
not taken in a normative sense. An “error” for the intuitive rule might be to choose the same option as
the deliberative rule when both are in conflict.
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fallacy (Krajbich et al., 2015). This problem can be avoided by concentrating on averages
which do not condition on particular choices (e.g., response times under high vs. low
cognitive load, across all decisions). A different way to derive testable predictions rests
on the concepts of alignment and conflict. Recall that xD and xI are the choices made
more often by the rules D and I, respectively. In this sense, they are the prescriptions of
the rules, even if those do not always select them. We speak of conflict if the behavioral
rules make different prescriptions (xD 6= xI), and of alignment if both behavioral rules
make the same prescription (xD = xI).
This distinction is important. First, in some experiments, the prescriptions of the
behavioral rules might be clear beforehand, hence observable. For example, a myopic
best reply can be computed ex ante, even if a noisy best-reply rule does not always select
it. An imitative rule will prescribe to follow the alternative with the highest observed
payoffs, even if the actual choice sometimes deviates from that prescription. A rule
approximating normatively optimal behavior will deliver clear prescriptions, even if the
actual rule is error-prone. Thus, once the experimenter has focused on two particular
rules, whether a specific decision happens under conflict or under alignment might be ex
ante observable.
Second, in any experiment relying on cognitive load, the assumption is that the shift
to more intuitive processes will result in an observable change in behavior. This might
not always be the case, however. Intuitive processes are in themselves not flawed: rather,
they have evolved because they economize cognitive resources while delivering a good
response in evolutionarily typical situations. Hence, in many cases, they will actually
prescribe the same response as more deliberative processes (alignment). It is only when
they are used in an evolutionarily new situation that they will conflict with the latter
and prescribe erroneous or suboptimal responses. In particular, no effects on behavior
(e.g., performance impairments) should be expected in a situation of alignment.
3.2 Response Times Effects
Our first result is straightforward. Even though the response times of individual pro-
cesses (conditional on process selection) are unobservable (because any choice might have
been selected by any process), observable response times are a convex combination of the
response times of the different processes. The effects of cognitive load on response times
for tasks in the economic domain are then rather intuitive. Cognitive load shifts the
balance toward more impulsive/automatic processes, that is, the percentage of decisions
accruing to such processes increases. Since automatic processes are faster, one immedi-
ately obtains the apparently paradoxical conclusion that response times must decrease
under cognitive load. This is captured by the following straightforward result.
Theorem 1. Assume (R) and (L). Under cognitive load,
(H1a) the expected response time decreases; and
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(H1b) the expected response time conditional on either conflict or alignment decreases.
Proof. The expected response time is (1 − Δ)RD + ΔRI = RD + Δ(RI − RD). Since
RI < RD by (R), this quantity decreases under cognitive load by (L). This is independent
of whether one conditions to conflict or alignment.
Note that (H1b) is still true if one allows for differences in Δ across conflict and
alignment situations (for instance, it might be reasonable to assume that Δ is smaller
in case of conflict, reflecting conflict detection and resolution by the central executive).
In this latter case, (H1a) also holds, provided the experiment avoids confounds which
would alter the proportion of decisions of each type across cognitive load treatments.
As we will show below, behavioral effects under cognitive load should only be expected
(if any) in case of conflict, and hence we consider it preferable to concentrate on the
conditional prediction (H1b) in experiments where the distinction between conflict and
alignment is observable, and revert to (H1a) if not. In the experiments we report on
below, we will face both kinds of situations.
We also remark that, to keep the model simple, we have assumed that process re-
sponse times in themselves are unaffected by load. This can be easily generalized. In
particular, a natural model of cognitive load in terms of drift-diffusion processes would
be to assume that the process barriers are lowered, resulting in lowered process consis-
tency (more randomness). This immediately results in faster process response times,
which adds to the effect shown above.
In tasks proper of cognitive psychology, where response times are extremely short,
the effect identified in Theorem 1 is likely to be small and other, more mechanical
effects might dominate. However, shorter response times under cognitive load have been
observed in a few studies using complex tasks (most cognitive load studies in economics
do not report response times). Specifically, Whitney et al. (2008) observe this effect in
a study on framing under phonological-loop cognitive load, and Gerhardt et al. (2016)
report shorter response times in lottery choices when using a cognitive load manipulation
targeting the visuospatial sketchpad. However, those studies delivered no explanation
for the effect. Whitney et al. (2008) conjectured that participants speeded up their
decisions “in order to maintain high accuracy” (see Section 7 for further discussion).
3.3 Behavioral Effects
The effect of cognitive load on choice frequencies, however, is less than straightforward.
It is often argued that cognitive load should increase the frequency of those decisions
prescribed (selected most frequently) by the more impulsive behavioral rules. This in-
tuitive conclusion, however, depends on additional assumptions and might be false in
general. To substantiate this claim, we start by noting that, in addition to the process
shift captured by (L), cognitive load is likely to affect choice frequencies for individ-
ual processes. According to the literature reviewed in Section 2, processes relying on
cognitive resources will be selectively impaired. This leads to the following assumption.
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(B1) PD decreases strictly under cognitive load, and PD(x) increases weakly for all
x 6= xD.
This assumption states that the more deliberative behavioral rule becomes more
noisy, hence selecting the deliberative choice less often (and all other options at least
as often). This assumption is natural. In the domain of cognitive psychology, where
automatic processes are pure stimulus-response reflexes, it is also natural to assume
that they do not rely on cognitive resources and should be unaffected by cognitive load.
Even though dual-process theories often speak of deliberative and automatic processes
for simplicity, the automaticity dimension is actually viewed as a continuum (e.g., Bargh,
1989). The actual postulate is that decision processes in the human mind differ in their
degree of automaticity. We subscribe the view that the intuitive rule is a more automatic
behavioral rule than the deliberative rule (hence our assumptions (R) and (P)), but we
would not assume that it is void of any cognitive/deliberative content.
Alas, if the intuitive behavioral rule can also be affected by cognitive load, then no
predictions can be made in terms of choice frequencies, as the following example shows.
Example 1. Consider a situation of conflict, X = {xD, xI , y, z} with xD 6= xI . Let
PD = 0.4, PD(x) = 0.2 for all x 6= xD, P I = 0.7, and P I(x) = 0.1 for all x 6= xI . Denote
choice probabilities under cognitive load with the subscript L. Let PD
L
= 0.25 + 3ε,
PD
L
(x) = 0.25 − ε for all x 6= xD, P I
L
= 0.4, and P I
L
(x) = 0.2 for all x 6= xI , with
0 < ε < 0.05. Further, let Δ = 0.25 − δ and ΔL = 0.5, with −0.25 < δ < 0.25.
This example fulfills (L), (B1), and (P) both with and without cognitive load. Further,
xD is the modal response of the deliberative process both with and without load, and
analogously for xI . The probabilities of an intuitive choice with and without cognitive
load are
P (xI |Load) = 0.25 − ε+ 0.5(0.4 − 0.25 + ε) = 0.325 − 0.5ε,
P (xI |No Load) = 0.2 + (0.7− 0.2)(0.25 − δ) = 0.325 − 0.5δ.
Thus,
P (xI |Load)− P (xI |No Load) = 0.5(δ − ε)
which can take positive, negative, or zero values in the admissible ranges of ε, δ.
The conclusion that cognitive load should lead to more intuitive choices in case of
conflict, however, can only be reached under the strong additional assumption that the
intuitive rule is purely automatic and hence unaffected by cognitive load.
(B2) The probabilities P I(x) are unaffected by cognitive load.
The following result makes this observation explicit. However, we remark that we do
not expect the data to conform to this prediction because we consider (B2) unwarranted.
Theorem 2. Assume (P) holds with and without cognitive load. Under (L), (B1), and
(B2),
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(H2) in case of conflict, the frequency of intuitive choices increases under cognitive load.
Proof. Let all probabilities under cognitive load be denoted with the subscript L. The
probability of intuitive choices under cognitive load is







(xI) + (ΔL −Δ)P
I +ΔP I
where ΔL − Δ > 0 by (L) and the probability of x
I under the intuitive process is




(xI) by (P) and the definition of
xD. Hence,
P (xI |Load) > (1−Δ)PDL (x
I) +ΔP I ≥ (1−Δ)PD(xI) +ΔP I = P (xI |No Load)
where the second inequality follows from (B1).
Even under the strong assumption (B2), however, the prediction does not extend to
situations of alignment, as the following example shows.
Example 2. Consider a situation of alignment, X = {xD, y, z, w} with xD = xI . As
in the previous example, let PD = 0.4, PD(x) = 0.2 for all x 6= xD, P I = 0.7, and
P I(x) = 0.1 for all x 6= xD. Denote choice probabilities under cognitive load with
the subscript L. Let again PD
L
= 0.25 + 3ε, PD
L
(x) = 0.25 − ε for all x 6= xD, with
0 < ε < 0.05, and Δ = 0.25 − δ and ΔL = 0.5, with −0.25 < δ < 0.25. Contrary to
the last example, assume P I
L
(x) = P I(x) for all x ∈ X. This example fulfills (P) both
with and without cognitive load, and also (L), (B1), and (B2). The probabilities of an
imitative choice with and without cognitive load are
P (xI |Load) = 0.25 + 3ε+ 0.5(0.7 − 0.25 − 3ε) = 0.475 + 1.5ε
P (xI |No Load) = 0.4 + (0.7 − 0.4)(0.25 − δ) = 0.475 − 0.3δ.
Thus,
P (xI |Load)− P (xI |No Load) = 1.5ε+ 0.3δ
which again can be positive, negative, or zero in the admissible ranges of ε, δ.
Theorem 2 and Examples 1 and 2 show that, in economic multi-alternative deci-
sion making, cognitive load might often fail to produce measurable results on choice
frequencies. First, the natural hypothesis in the choice domain follows only if the strong
assumption (B2) is made, or equivalently if the postulated intuitive process is of purely
automatic nature, that is, it places no demands on cognitive resources (or, by continuity,
very low demands). Second, even under that assumption, the result only follows in case
of conflict and might not obtain if conflict and alignment are not clearly distinguished.
This observation is of independent interest given that cognitive load manipulation often
fail to deliver results in economic tasks.
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In summary, we view the strong prediction (H1a,b) derived from Theorem 1 as a
manipulation check which can be used to verify that cognitive load was successfully
implemented. Once this is established, we view the additional prediction (H2) derived
from Theorem 2 as a test of the additional assumption (B2) on the nature of the intuitive
behavioral rule.
4 Experiments 1–3: Cournot Markets
In this section we discuss three different experiments where participants took the role
of firm managers in Cournot oligopolies. In this particular strategic setting, previous
evidence suggests that two specific behavioral rules are particularly important. On the
one hand, myopic best reply captures one-step payoff maximization and can be seen as
a simple proxy of deliberative thinking. On the other hand, a large strand of research
has suggested imitation of successful strategies as an alternative rule governing behav-
ior. Theoretical results by Schaffer (1989) and Vega-Redondo (1997) have shown that
imitation in Cournot oligopolies mimics maximization of relative payoffs and, if firms
follow imitative behavioral rules and make infrequent mistakes, the resulting stochastic
dynamics converges to the Walrasian equilibrium (and not to the Cournot-Nash equi-
librium). This result extends to a larger class of economic interactions (aggregative
games Alós-Ferrer and Ania, 2005). A number of laboratory experiments on Cournot
oligopolies have found partial convergence to Walrasian outcomes, which can be taken
as indirect evidence for the presence of imitative behavior (Huck et al., 1999; Offerman
et al., 2002; Apestegúıa et al., 2007, 2010). Buckert et al. (2017) conducted a Cournot
oligopoly experiment adding an additional task which required attention in some trials
(which could be interpreted as a form of cognitive load), and found evidence compati-
ble with increased reliance on imitation. However, Bosch-Domènech and Vriend (2003)
found no stronger reliance on imitation in a Cournot oligopoly experiment when cogni-
tive demands were increased by implementing time limits and describing payoff tables
in an inconvenient way. Alós-Ferrer and Ritschel (2020) measured response times in
a Cournot oligopoly experiment and found evidence of multiplicity of behavioral rules
along the lines of myopic best reply and imitation.
In all three experiments below, the prescriptions of myopic best reply and imitation
can be determined ex ante for each individual decision. Thus, tests can be made con-
ditional on conflict or alignment. The experiments used different cognitive load tasks
and within vs. between designs. For ease of exposition, we first present the shared ex-
perimental design and then the cognitive load manipulations. Finally, we discuss the
results for response times (predictions H1a,b) and choices (prediction H2) for all three
experiments.
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4.1 Shared Experimental Design
Participants in Experiments 1–3 interacted in 4-player Cournot oligopolies (tetrapolies).
The design (except for the cognitive load manipulations discussed in the next subsec-
tion) followed Alós-Ferrer and Ritschel (2020). Subjects participated in three different
oligopolies (parts), with 17 rounds each (total of 51 rounds). For each part, we computed
a payoff table using a Cournot oligopoly with zero costs and a linear inverse demand
function of the form P (Q) = a − Q, where P (·) is the inverse demand function, a the
saturated demand, and Q the total quantity in the market. During the experiment a
neutral framing was used and neither firms nor quantities were mentioned. We reduced
the action space to four possible actions, i.e. A, B, C, and D with either increasing
or decreasing quantities from A to D.2 Hence, the whole payoff table had dimensions
4× 20, with four rows representing the possible actions and 20 columns labeled AAA to
DDD representing the possible actions of the opponents.
Payoffs were expressed in points, with an exchange rate of 20 Eurocents per 1000
points. The points achieved in all 51 rounds were accumulated and paid at the end of
the experiment. After the first round the participants were informed about the outcome
of the previous round. Before making the next choice, participants saw the full payoff
table, their own choice and earnings from the previous round, and the previous choice
and earnings from the other three group members. The first round in each part did
not provide any information on the previous round and was therefore dropped for the
analysis, yielding 16 rounds in each part for a total of 48 rounds.
4.2 Experimental Procedures and Cognitive Load Manipulations
Experiments 1–3 were conducted at the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research
(CLER), University of Cologne, and programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Partic-
ipants were recruited using (Greiner, 2015), and were students from the University of
Cologne excluding those with majors in Psychology, Economics, or Advanced Business
Administration. They received a performance-based payment plus a show-up fee of 2.50
Euro.
4.2.1 Experiment 1: High-Demand Load (Between)
In Experiment 1, we ran 6 sessions with 24 participants each for a total of N = 144
(87 females; age range 18–39 years, mean 23.2 years). The experiment was conceived as
a between-subject manipulation, with 72 subjects in a Load treatment and the remain-
ing 72 in a No Load treatment (three sessions each). Average earnings, including the
show-up fee, were 13.61 Euro and 20.12 Euro under No Load and Load, respectively.
2The three parts were implemented to avoid that data would be rendered meaningless by convergence
to the Walrasian outcome, since after convergence occurs, there is no behavioral variance. Payoff table 1:
P (Q) = 150−Q, A = 37.5, B = 33.25, C = 30, D = 18.75 (or reversed); Payoff table 2: P (Q) = 175−Q,
A = 43.75, B = 38.875, C = 35, D = 21.875 (or reversed); Payoff table 3: P (Q) = 200 − Q, A = 50,
B = 44.5, C = 40, D = 25 (or reversed).
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Participants in the Load treatment earned more due to the additional earnings in the
cognitive load task; excluding those (earnings from the main decision in the Load treat-
ment 14.06 Euro), average earnings were not significantly different across treatments
(MWW, N = 144, z = −1.489, p = .1365). A session lasted around 85 and 105 minutes
in the No Load and Load treatments, respectively.
In the Load treatment, participants were asked to memorize a seven-digit number
which was displayed for 10 seconds before each Cournot oligopoly decision, and recall
it after that decision (within 10 seconds). Memorizing a number is a common cogni-
tive load task targeting the phonological loop and has been implemented in a variety of
experiments (Roch et al., 2000; Hinson et al., 2002; Lavie and de Fockert, 2005; Car-
penter et al., 2013). Correct recall was incentivized with an additional 750 points. As a
comparison, participants earned an average of 1200 points per round from the Cournot
oligopoly decision. In the No Load treatment, no load was present during the whole
experiment.
4.2.2 Experiment 2: High-Demand Load (Within)
Data was collected in two sessions with 28 and 32 participants, respectively, for a total
of 60 participants (36 female; age range 18–70 years, mean 26.3 years). Average earnings
were 17.67 Euro (ranging from 12.70 to 21.70 Euro including the show-up fee). A session
lasted about 105 minutes.
The cognitive load manipulation was the same as in Experiment 1, but was imple-
mented within-subject. In each of the three parts, 8 rounds corresponded to Load and
8 to No Load. The very first round of each part, excluded from the analysis, was also
under No Load. Again, correct recall was incentivized with an additional 750 points.
Rounds without cognitive load included no memorization task.
4.2.3 Experiment 3: Low-Demand Load (Within)
Data was collected in two sessions of 32 participants each for a total of 64 participants
(28 female; age range 18–33 years, mean 24.6 years). Average earnings were 18.45 Euro
(ranging from 15.00 to 26.50 Euro, including the show-up fee). A session lasted about
105 minutes.
As in Experiment 2, we implemented two within-subject treatments, Load and No
Load, but relied on a lower-intensity (easier) cognitive load manipulation targeting the
phonological loop. In each of the three parts, 8 rounds corresponded to Load and 8 to
No Load. The very first of each part, excluded from the analysis, was also under No
Load. For rounds with cognitive load, participants were asked to memorize a single-digit
number which was displayed for 5 seconds before the Cournot oligopoly screen appeared.
During the Cournot oligopoly decision task, the participants heard another single-digit
number via headphones which was played at a random time between 1 and 10 seconds.
After the Cournot decision was made, participants had and enter the sum of the two
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numbers in a new screen.3 The cognitive load task was incentivized and each correct
answer earned an additional 750 points. Rounds without cognitive load included no
additional task.
4.3 Results: Response Times
To test predictions H1a,b, we computed the individual-level average response times for
decisions taken in the No Load and Load treatments, for each of the Experiments 1–3.
First, we confirm prediction H1a for all three experiments. In Experiment 1 (between),
participants in the Load treatment were on average faster (9.43 s) than those in the No
Load treatment (13.15 s; Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test, MWW, N = 144, z = −4.962,
p < .0001). In Experiment 2 (within), participants took on average 9.89 s for rounds
under load and 14.90 s for those without load (Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test, WSR, N =
60, z = −6.589, p < .0001). In Experiment 3 (within), using the easier cognitive load
task, participants took on average 14.34 s under load and 15.22 s without load. This is
a smaller but still significant difference (WSR, N = 64, z = −3.110, p = .0019).
Figure 1 displays the averages of the individual-level average response times for
decisions taken in the No Load and Load treatments, for each of the Experiments 1–3.
Data is split according to whether the decisions in each round were made under conflict
or alignment (that is, whether the imitative choice and the myopic best reply differ or
coincide, respectively), as required to test for Prediction H1b.
Indeed, we confirm Prediction H1b in conflict situations for all three experiments.
The predicted relation holds between subjects for Experiment 1 (Load, 9.30 s; No Load
treatment, 13.10 s; MWW, N = 144, z = −5.110, p < .0001), and within subjects for
Experiment 2 (Load rounds, 9.77 s; No Load rounds, 14.85 s; WSR, N = 60, z = −6.522,
p < .0001) and Experiment 3 (Load rounds, 14.22 s; No Load rounds, 15.28 s; WSR,
N = 64, z = −3.397, p = .0007). The prediction also holds for alignment situations in
Experiment 1 (Load, 10.41; No Load, 13.32 s; MWW, N = 144, z = −3.548, p = .0004)
and Experiment 2 (Load rounds 10.28 s; No Load rounds, 15.78 s; WSR, N = 57,
z = −5.145, p < .0001).4 In Experiment 3, relying on the easier cognitive load task,
participants were also faster on average in Load rounds (14.60 s) compared to No Load
rounds (15.33 s), but the difference was not significant (WSR, N = 63, z = −1.280,
p = .2005).
4.4 Results: Behavior
The previous subsection shows that the cognitive load manipulations were implemented
successfully in Experiments 1–3. Following the standard logic of cognitive load manip-
ulations, one would expect a shift toward more intuitive decisions, which in this case
3This design makes the manipulation closer to Buckert et al. (2017), who used a concurrent “distrac-
tion” task. We thank Ronald Hübner for suggesting this manipulation.

















































Figure 1: Cournot oligopoly experiments. Average response times of decisions under
load and no load in conflict and alignment, Experiments 1–3. MWW (Experiment 1)
and WSR tests (Experiments 2 and 3), ⋆ p < .1, ⋆⋆ p < .05, and ⋆⋆⋆ p < .01.
means more imitative choices. By virtue of Theorem 2, our model would actually sup-
port this prediction, but only for decisions under conflict, and only if we accept the
strong additional assumption (B2). In our Cournot oligopoly experiments, this assump-
tion states that imitation should be unaffected by cognitive load, which we consider
implausible. Imitation can be assumed to be less deliberative than myopic best reply,
but it is unlikely to be a purely automatic process not relying on any cognitive resources.
Figure 2 displays the relative frequency of imitative choices in conflict situations
for Experiments 1–3, across (between or within) treatments. There were, however, no
significant differences in Experiment 1 (Load subjects, 37.49% imitative choices; No
Load subjects, 34.97%; MWW, N = 144, z = 0.452, p = .6516) or in Experiment 3
(Load rounds, 30.42%; No Load rounds, 31.22%; WSR, N = 64, z = −0.174, p = .8620).
In Experiment 2, the relative frequency of imitation did increase significantly under
cognitive load (Load rounds, 34.96%; No Load rounds, 31.79%; WSR, N = 60, z = 2.05,
p = .0403). In summary, results are mixed and do offer only weak or no support for
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Figure 2: Cournot oligopoly experiments. Relative frequency of imitation decisions in
conflict situations, Experiments 1–3. MWW (Experiment 1) and WSR tests (Experi-
ments 2, 3), ⋆ p < .1, ⋆⋆ p < .05, and ⋆⋆⋆ p < .01
4.5 Discussion (Experiments 1–3)
Cournot oligopoly experiments with a large payoff table deliver an example of economi-
cally relevant but relatively complex individual decisions. In three separate experiments
using both between and within settings and relying on two different cognitive load ma-
nipulations, we show that decisions under cognitive load are, as predicted by (H1a,b),
faster under cognitive load. The difference in response times remains as expected when
disentangling decisions according to whether they were made under conflict or under
alignment.
The cognitive load manipulation we use in Experiments 1 and 2 is widely used in the
literature. Using this manipulation, the effect on response times is relatively large. The
effect is much smaller (although still generally significant) in Experiment 3, suggesting
that the manipulation we used in this case was indeed weaker. To substantiate this
claim, we computed the individual-level difference in average response times between No
Load and Load in case of conflict in Experiments 2 and 3 (which both involved within-
subject manipulations; we focused on conflict because the basic effect is significant in
both experiments in this case). The difference was significantly larger in Experiment 2
(5.08 s) compared to Experiment 3 (1.06 s; MWW test, N = 124, z = 5.980, p < .0001).
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In particular, we conclude that our manipulations successfully impaired cognitive
resources. In spite of this, actual effects on behavior were obtained only in Experiment
2, yielding weak support to the conventional wisdom that impairing cognitive resources
should increase the frequency of the actions (most often) prescribed by (more) intuitive
processes. This is, however, compatible with the view that cognitive load might also
partially affect the inner workings of more (but not fully) intuitive processes, for in this
case assumption (B2) is unwarranted and prediction (H2) does not necessarily follow.
5 Experiments 4–6: Voting Decisions
In this section, we discuss three voting experiments where participants took the role of
committee members and voted for different options according to two voting methods.
One reason to use voting experiments is that, as we will discuss below, they constitute an
example of a complex situation where, even though there are natural candidates for two
different behavioral rules, the actual prescriptions do not suffice to distinguish conflict
and alignment ex ante. However, our results still make a clear prediction (H1a) and
the standard logic behind cognitive manipulations still suffices to identify an expected
behavioral effect.
An important objective of a voting method is to elicit and represent the electorate’s
preferences faithfully. However, theoretical results in social choice theory have shown
that any voting method within a wide family is manipulable and creates incentives to vote
strategically, misrepresenting the own actual preferences (Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite,
1975). This is especially true for Plurality Voting, where each voter casts a single vote
for his or her most-preferred alternative, a method which forms the basis of most actual
electoral methods in use in Western societies. A particular problem is the “wasted vote”
effect, where voters refrain from supporting their actually-preferred candidate or party
in the belief that its winning chances are too small, supporting a popular alternative
instead not because they actually prefer it, but because it is the least-disliked among
those likely to win.
An alternative method which partially escapes manipulability (because it does not
belong to the class covered by the results mentioned above) is Approval Voting (Brams
and Fishburn, 1978; Alós-Ferrer and Buckenmaier, 2019). In this method, voters can
vote for (“approve of”) as many alternatives as they see fit, with the winner determined
by simple majority of approvals. In particular, Approval Voting escapes the waste vote
effect, since approving of a non-favorite option can be accomplished by merely moving
the approval threshold without misrepresenting preferences, and, in particular, without
disapproving of the favorite option. Voting field experiments have provided evidence
that election outcomes might greatly differ if Approval Voting were used instead of
more-established methods (Laslier and Van der Straeten, 2008; Alós-Ferrer and Granić,
2012, 2015).
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In the context of voting, hence, the natural behavioral rules to consider are sincere
voting vs. strategic behavior. Since the latter requires reasoning about the likely behavior
of others, it should correspond to a more deliberative mode of thinking. This is also in
agreement with the more general view that sincerity is an intuitive reaction, e.g. as
compared to dishonest behavior (Cappelen et al., 2013; Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi,
2013).
In contrast to the experiments in the previous section, the actual prescriptions of
one of the postulated behavioral rules are unclear. This is because there is considerable
heterogeneity in strategic behavior (Stahl and Wilson, 1995; Ho et al., 1998), and hence
the actual prescriptions in this case would depend on a variety of individual correlates
including cognitive capacity. Thus, although in the experiments below it is always pos-
sible to determine whether a decision was sincere or not, it is not possible to classify
decisions as happening in conflict or alignment. This, however, is no obstacle for our
analysis, because prediction (H1a) does not rely on this classification. As for effects on
behavior, though, this is an example where conventional wisdom would expect a shift
toward more intuitive behavior (in this case, sincere voting) under cognitive load, but
actual theoretical results are lacking, since prediction (H2) does hinge on decisions being
made under conflict.
The experiments again used different cognitive load manipulations, but were all
within-subject. As in the previous section, we first present the common experimen-
tal design, then the cognitive load manipulations, and finally the results for response
times and voting decisions for all three experiments.
5.1 Shared Experimental Design
For Experiments 4–6, we considered a complex voting decision. The decision task was
strictly individual, because no feedback on voting outcomes was provided until the end
of the experiment. We relied on the standard design of voting experiments following
Forsythe et al. (1993, 1996) (see also Granić, 2017). Specifically, the main decision task
was to cast a vote using different voting methods, implemented in separate blocks.
Participants were allocated to groups of six voters each and cast their votes for
four possible alternatives, A, B, C, and D. In each group, there were three voter types,
with two participants randomly allocated to each type. They were confronted with
“societies” represented by payoff profiles which consisted of a payoff outcome for each
possible alternative and each type, i.e. a 3 × 4 payoff table. Votes were cast according
to either Plurality Voting or Approval Voting. Participants voted multiple times in two
different voting blocks, one per method. The order of methods was counterbalanced
across participants.
Under Plurality Voting, each participant voted for exactly one of the alternatives
and the alternative with the most votes won. Under Approval Voting, each participant
voted for as many alternatives as she approved of and the alternative with the most
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Table 1: Voter Profiles, Experiments 4–6. Societies 1 and 2 were used in experiment 4;
Societies 3 and 4 were used in experiments 5–6.
Society 1 (Exp. 4)
Voter # A B C D
Type 1 2 60 50 70 80
Type 2 2 70 80 50 60
Type 3 2 70 60 80 50
Society 2 (Exp. 4)
Voter # A B C D
Type 1 2 50 70 80 60
Type 2 2 50 80 70 60
Type 3 2 80 70 50 60
Society 3 (Exp. 5,6)
Voter # A B C D
Type 1 2 60 50 70 80
Type 2 2 70 80 50 60
Type 3 2 70 60 80 50
Society 4 (Exp. 5,6)
Voter # A B C D
Type 1 2 50 60 80 70
Type 2 2 50 80 70 60
Type 3 2 80 70 50 60
approvals won. Ties were broken randomly.5 At the end of the experiment, one voting
round was randomly drawn and the winning alternative was determined according to
the voting method and the votes of all members of the group.
Experiment 4 used the payoff profiles of Societies 1 and 2 in Table 1, while Experi-
ments 5 and 6 used Societies 3 and 4. The exchange rate was 12 Eurocents per point.
In each experiment, each payoff profiles was used four times per voting method, but the
payoffs were jittered using small random perturbations which did not alter the ordinal
relation among outcomes. Furthermore, the names of the alternatives were shuffled and
the rows in the payoff profile rearranged to avoid demand for consistency. In Experiment
4, each voter’s (actual) type also changed across voting decisions, while in Experiments
5 and 6 it was fixed.
5.2 Experimental Procedures and Cognitive Load Manipulations
Procedures and recruitment for Experiments 4–6 were as those for Experiments 1–3,
including software platforms. Participants were students from the University of Cologne
excluding those with majors in Psychology, and those who had participated in previous
voting experiments. They received a performance-based payment of 4 Euro (as the
lab-mandated fee had increased with respect to Experiments 1–3).
5.2.1 Experiment 4: High-Demand Load (Within)
In Experiment 4, we ran 2 sessions with 30 participants each for a total of N = 60
(38 females; age range 18–32 years, mean 23.1 years). Average earnings were 18.29 Euro
5The experiment included a third “voting method” in the form of an incentive-compatible preference
elicitation task as in Alós-Ferrer and Buckenmaier (2020), but there were no qualitative differences
between elicited preferences and payoff-induced preferences.
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Table 2: Order of Cognitive Load Rounds and Payoff Profiles Within a Voting Block.
Top: Experiment 4; Bottom: Experiments 5–6.
Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Load No Yes No Yes Yes No No Yes
Society 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1
Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Load No Yes Yes No No No Yes No No Yes
Society 3 4 3 4 Filler Filler 3 4 3 4
(ranging from 12.00 to 22.20 Euro including the show-up fee6). A session lasted around
75 minutes.
The cognitive load manipulation was the same as in Experiment 2, and also imple-
mented within subjects. The payoff for correct recall was 40 points (one round was
randomly selected for payment). Table 2(top) details the order of payoff profiles and
treatments within each block of voting decisions. Payoff profiles were jittered indepen-
dently each voting round.
5.2.2 Experiment 5: High-Demand Load (Within)
In Experiment 5, we ran 4 sessions with 30 participants each for a total of N = 120
(68 females; age range 18–30 years, mean 23.3 years). Average earnings were 15.53 Euro
(ranging from 9.60 to 18.80 Euro including the show-up fee). A session lasted around
75 minutes.
The cognitive load manipulation was as in Experiments 2 and 4, and also imple-
mented within subjects. The payoff for correct recall was reduced to 30 points (one
round was randomly selected for payment). Table 2(bottom) details the order of pay-
off profiles and treatments within each block of voting decisions. There were two filler
rounds with additional (different) profiles without load. Payoff profiles for Societies 3
and 4 were jittered twice, so that the exact same profiles were presented after and before
the filler tasks (and each profile was faced with and without load), but participants saw
four different profiles before the filler tasks, and four different profiles after them.
5.2.3 Experiment 6: Taxing the Visuospatial Sketchpad
In Experiment 6, we ran 4 sessions with 30 participants each for a total of N = 120
(74 females; age range 17–58 years, mean 23.1 years). Average earnings were 15.40 Euro
(ranging from 9.20 to 18.80 Euro including the show-up fee). A session lasted around
65 minutes.
6Due to a programming error, each participant received 12 extra points at the end of the experiment.
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Figure 3: Visual Load Grids, Experiment 6.























The voting task and voting block design was identical to Experiment 5. The cognitive
load task, however, substantially differed from all previous experiments. We switched
to another subsystem of working memory, the visuospatial sketchpad. The task we used
required memorizing a visual pattern which cannot be easily (and silently) articulated
as a number sequence as in the previous experiments. This task is widely used in the
psychological literature (Bethell-Fox and Shepard, 1988; Miyake et al., 2001; De Neys,
2006; Franssens and De Neys, 2009; Trémolière et al., 2012; Johnson et al., 2016). The
visual pattern consisted of a dot matrix displayed as a 3× 3 grid containing 4 black and
5 white dots (see examples in Table 3).7 The matrix was presented for 1 second and had
to be recalled (by activating black dots in an empty grid) after the voting decision. The
rest of the implementation details (including payment) were as in Experiment 5.
5.3 Results: Response Times
Since we cannot disentangle decisions in conflict and in alignment, we compute individual
average response times differentiating decisions under Load and No Load. Prediction
(H1a) then states that, if cognitive load has been successfully induced, decisions under
Load must be significantly faster. Figure 4 displays the average of the individual average
response times conditional on treatment, for each of the Experiments 4–6. Data is split
according to voting method (PV=Plurality Voting, AV=Approval Voting).
We confirm prediction H1a for Experiments 4 and 5 under both voting methods. In
Experiment 4, decisions under Load were on average faster than those under No Load
both for Plurality Voting (Load, 15.32 s; No Load,21.77 s; WSR, N = 60, z = −5.683,
p < .0001) and for Approval Voting (Load, 15.25 s; No Load, 22.01 s; WSR, N = 60,
z = −5.897, p < .0001). The same holds for Experiment 5 (Plurality Voting: Load,
18.25 s; No Load, 23.18 s; WSR, N = 120, z = −6.474, p < .0001; Approval Voting:
Load, 19.09 s; No Load, 24.49 s; WSR, N = 120, z = −6.822, p < .0001).
7The patterns were rotated versions of the following base patterns taken from Bethell-Fox and Shepard




















































Figure 4: Average response times of voting decisions under load and no load in Plurality
Voting (PV) and Approval Voting (AV), Experiments 4, 5, and 6. WSR test, ⋆ p < .1,
⋆⋆ p < .05, and ⋆⋆⋆ p < .01.
In Experiment 6, prediction (H1a) was also confirmed under Approval Voting (Load,
21.09 s; No Load, 22.92 s; WSR, N = 120, z = −3.245, p = .0012), although the differ-
ence was of smaller magnitude. There was, however, no significant effect for Plurality
Voting (Load, 21.57 s; No Load 21.68 s; WSR, N = 120, z = −.720, p = .4714).
5.4 Results: Behavior
The previous subsection shows that the cognitive load manipulations were implemented
successfully in Experiments 4–6. In this case, the received logic behind cognitive load
manipulations would lead us to expect a shift toward more sincere voting, reflecting the
more deliberative nature of strategic behavior. However, our Theorem 2 would only
support this prediction for decisions under conflict, and only if we accept the additional
assumption (B2).
Sincere voting under Plurality Voting corresponds to voting for the most-preferred
alternative. Under Approval Voting, a ballot is sincere if it includes all alternatives
strictly preferred to any alternative in the ballot. Figure 5 displays the relative frequency













































Figure 5: Relative frequency of sincere votes, Experiments 4, 5, and 6. WSR, ⋆ p < .1,
⋆⋆ p < .05, and ⋆⋆⋆ p < .01
We find significant effects in Experiment 4. Under Plurality Voting, in this exper-
iment, 64.17% of the decisions under Load were sincere, compared to 55.42% sincere
votes under No Load (WSR, N = 60, z = −2.260, p = .0238). There was a marginally
significant difference in the expected direction also for Approval Voting (Load, 87.50%;
No Load, 82.92%; WSR, N = 60, z = −1.683, p = .0924).
In contrast, there were no significant differences for either method, neither in Ex-
periment 5 (Plurality Voting: Load, 60.00%; No Load, 57.71%; WSR, N = 120, z =
−1.266, p = .2055; Approval Voting: Load, 89.17%; No Load, 88.54%; WSR, N = 120,
z = −0.512, p = .6087) nor in Experiment 6 (Plurality Voting: Load, 58.54%; No Load,
58.54%; WSR, N = 120, z = 0.152, p = .8789; Approval Voting: Load, 88.33%; No
Load, 87.92%; WSR, N = 120, z = −0.710, p = .4776). Thus, results are again mixed
and offer no strong support for the expected behavioral effects of cognitive load.
5.5 Discussion (Experiments 4–6)
Voting experiments involving even small committees (six members in our case) involve
complex, strategic decisions which interact with the voting method in place. In three
separate experiments using two different voting methods (Plurality and Approval Voting)
and two different cognitive load manipulations, we show that decisions under cognitive
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load are, as predicted by (H1a), faster under cognitive load. The experiments are an
example of a setting where, even though there exist clear candidates for the involved
intuitive and deliberative processes, individual heterogeneity precludes identifying the
prescriptions of the latter and hence differentiating conflict and alignment. However,
Theorem 1 still delivers a prediction, which we readily find in the data.
Experiment 6 relied on a manipulation targeting the visuospatial sketchpad, instead
of the phonological loop as most of our experiments. Thus, it is difficult to compare
the strength of this manipulation with those of other ones from an ex ante point of
view. However, our results show that the predicted difference in response times obtains
only for one of the voting methods, and is of smaller magnitude than that found in
other experiments, suggesting that the manipulation indeed differs from those targeting
the phonological loop, and is most likely weaker. To substantiate this observation, we
computed the individual-level differences in average response times between No Load
and Load in Approval Voting in Experiments 5 and 6 (we focused on AV because the
basic effect is significant in both experiments for this method). The difference was larger
in Experiment 5 (5.41 s) than in Experiment 6 (1.83 s; MWW test, N = 240, z = 3.777,
p = .0002). This is of independent interest, since the particular manipulation used in
Experiment 6 is frequently used in the psychological literature.
We conclude that our manipulations also successfully impaired cognitive resources
in our voting experiments. However, effects on behavior reflecting conventional expecta-
tions were obtained only in Experiment 4. As in Experiments 1–3, the overall picture is
compatible with the view that cognitive load might also partially affect the more-intuitive
processes at work in this paradigm.
6 Experiment 7: Bayesian Updating
In this section, we discuss an experiment which differs from the previous ones along
several dimensions. First, we focus on a task which, although arising from the economics
literature (Charness and Levin, 2005; Achtziger and Alós-Ferrer, 2014), involves much
shorter response times (with averages between 1 and 3 s) than the ones in Experiments 1–
6 and hence might be closer to experiments in cognitive psychology in this sense. Second,
the task is completely non-strategic, in the sense that it does not involve thinking about
other agents’ decisions, but it is still relatively complex (as reflected by high error rates).
Third, the experiment includes three treatments, a control condition and two cognitive
load manipulations, and one of the latter is particularly taxing compared to previous
ones (a “central executive” load).
Specifically, we rely on a belief-updating task using an urns-and-balls paradigm as
typical of the judgment and decision making literature (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky,
1972; Grether, 1980, 1992), developed by Charness and Levin (2005) to study the possible
conflict between Bayesian updating of beliefs and a simple win-stay, lose-shift reinforce-
ment heuristic. This paradigm is interesting because participants can update their beliefs
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State (Prob) Left Urn Right Urn
First (1/2) ••••◦◦ ••••••
Second (1/2) ••◦◦◦◦ ◦◦◦◦◦◦
Figure 6: Schematic representation of the task in Experiment 7.
in a normative way on the basis of received information, but the latter carries a win-loss
frame, as is typical in many economic applications (project success vs. failure, firm’s
profits vs. losses, stocks going up or down, etc.). This frame cues basic reinforcement
behavior, giving rise to a focus on past performance and well-known behavioral anoma-
lies as outcome bias (e.g. Baron and Hershey, 1988). Charness and Levin (2005) showed
that error rates in this paradigm are particularly high, and Achtziger and Alós-Ferrer
(2014) used response times to show that the high error rates originate on reinforcement
behavior. Achtziger et al. (2015) investigated the neural foundations of reinforcement
behavior in this paradigm, and a number of other works have relied on it for further
research (Charness et al., 2007; Hügelschäfer and Achtziger, 2017; Alós-Ferrer et al.,
2017; Li et al., 2019).
In Experiment 7, thus, the behavioral rules we consider are a deliberative one imple-
menting optimal decisions following Bayesian updating of beliefs (or simply “Bayesian
updating” for short), and a more intuitive win-stay, lose-shift rule implementing a
reinforcement-based heuristic. This experiment is an example of a paradigmatic com-
parison between deliberative and intuitive/automatic processes. On the one hand, it
is well-known that human beings have notorious difficulties updating beliefs in a nor-
mative way (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1972; Grether, 1980, among many others),
and hence behavioral rules supporting normative behavior in this setting can be safely
considered deliberative. On the other hand, evidence from neuroscience shows that rein-
forcement learning bears all the markers of automaticity and is associated with very fast
and often-unconscious brain responses (e.g., Schultz, 1998; Holroyd and Coles, 2002).
6.1 Experimental Design
The decision task was as follows. There were two urns (left and right), each containing 6
balls, which could be black or white. Each participant completed 60 independent trials.
In each trial, a state of the world (first or second) was realized, with probability 1/2
for each state (see Figure 6). In the first state of the world, the left urn consisted of 4
black and 2 white balls and the right urn of 6 black balls. In the second state of the
world, the left urn consisted of 2 black and 4 white balls and the right urn of 6 white
balls. All this information (but not the actually-realized state of the world) was known
by participants.
In each trial, participants decided whether the left or the right urn should be used to
extract a single ball, and received a payment of 18 Eurocents if and only if the ball was
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of a pre-specified color (say, black).8 The extracted ball was replaced into the original
urn, and participants had to choose an urn again, with a new ball being extracted and
resulting in payment as in the first extraction. The focus of the analysis is on this second
decision within each trial, as a rational decision maker should use Bayes’ rule to update
his or her beliefs on the state of the world on the basis of the feedback (black or white
ball) from the first decision, but a reinforcer could use a simple “win-stay, lose-shift”
heuristic and stick to the previous choice if and only if it was successful.
The composition of the urns was such that both behavioral rules (Bayesian updating
and reinforcement) were always in conflict if the first extraction was from the left urn
(i.e., Bayesian updating prescribes “win-shift, lose-stay”), and always in alignment if
that first extraction was from the right urn (as the composition of the urns in that
case revealed the state of the world); see Charness and Levin (2005) or Achtziger and
Alós-Ferrer (2014) for details.
6.2 Experimental Procedures and Cognitive Load Manipulations
The experiment was carried out at the Social Psychology laboratory at the University
of Konstanz (Germany), with each participant being measured individually and inde-
pendently. Participants were 60 university students (21 female), randomly allocated
to three different treatments. They earned 11.62 Euro on average (the cognitive load
manipulations were not incentivized) and a session lasted around one hour.
In the No Load treatment, participants were not placed under any load. In the
Phonological Load treatment, participants completed the main task while repeating the
word “and” (German: “und”) every 1.5 seconds, following the rhythm given by a phys-
ical metronome placed on the table. This manipulation is known to specifically block
the phonological loop, which should lead to quick information decay (Baddeley, 1986;
Gathercole and Baddeley, 1993) similarly to memorizing a long sequence of digits. In the
Central Executive Load treatment, participants completed the main task while naming
random numbers (from zero to nine) aloud at the rhythm of the physical metronome.
This is a rather-strong manipulation which is known to seriously impair central execu-
tive functions and, in addition, tax working memory capacity (e.g. attention) to a strong
extent (Baddeley, 1966).
In all cases, participants received careful instructions on both the decision task and
the cognitive load task. They practiced the load task in the presence of the experimenter
and were instructed that successfully conducting this secondary task was a precondition
for payment in the main task. Their speech during the task was recorded and checked
to make sure that they complied with the manipulation (no participants neglected the
load task; however, recordings failed for two participants). They also went through five
practice trials of the main task under load.
8The actual colors were counterbalanced. Following Charness and Levin (2005) and Achtziger and


























































































Figure 7: Average response time in conflict and alignment situations (right-hand side)
and relative frequency of reinforcement decisions in conflict situations (left-hand side),
Experiment 7. MWW test, ⋆ p < 0.1, ⋆⋆ p < 0.05, ⋆⋆⋆ p < 0.01
6.3 Response Time Results
The left-hand side of Figure 7 displays the average (of individual average) response times
of the second draw in the No Load, Phonological Load, and Central Executive Load treat-
ments, conditional on conflict and alignment. The average response times of decisions
in case of conflict were 2, 712 ms in the No Load treatment, 1, 374 ms under Phonolog-
ical Load, and 1, 672 ms in the Central Executive Load treatment. Confirming (H1b),
the decrease in response times under load was significant according to Mann-Whitney-
Wilcoxon tests, adjusted for multiple comparisons according to the Holm-Bonferroni
method (Phonological Load vs. No Load, N = 40, z = −2.624, p = .0174; Central
Executive Load vs. No Load, N = 40, z = −1.894, p = .0583). The average response
times in alignment were 1, 056 ms, 1, 110 ms, and 1, 550 ms under No Load, Phonological
Load, and Central Executive Load, respectively. The difference between Phonological
Load and No Load was not significant (MWW, N = 40, z = 0.974, p = .3302), and the
difference between Central Executive Load and No Load was significant in the oppo-
site direction, that is, decisions in alignment under Central Executive Load were slower
(MWW, N = 40, z = 2.245, p = .0495).
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6.4 Behavioral Results
The right-hand side of Figure 7 displays the relative frequency of reinforcement (“win-
stay, lose-shift”) decisions in the three treatments in conflict situations. The frequencies
were 50.04% in the No Load treatment, 66.94% in the Phonological Load treatment,
and 52.59% in the Central Executive Load treatment. The increase in the relative
frequency of reinforcement under Phonological Load compared to No Load was in the
conventionally-expected direction, but missed significance (MWW, N = 40, z = 1.922,
p = .1093). There was no significant difference between Central Executive Load and No
Load (MWW, N = 40, z = 0.473, p = .6358).
6.5 Discussion (Experiment 7)
Experiment 7 involved a complex decision task for which, however, response times are
usually much shorter than in our previous experiments. The predicted effect of cognitive
load on response times is readily found for two different cognitive load treatments, but
only in case of conflict. In case of alignment, response times are particularly fast and the
effects are either negligible or go in the opposite direction, reflecting the more mechanical
aspects of having to perform an additional task during the main one. This serves as a
reminder of the fact that the domain of application of the effects we discuss is limited
to relatively complex tasks where response times are large enough for the differences
between processes to be dominant relative to more mechanical effects. This is likely to
include most tasks in economics, but few in more classical, cognitive-psychology ones.
Theorem 2 predicts an effect of cognitive load on behavior for decisions in case of
conflict. In this case, we do obtain a clear, significant difference in response times
(which is also of a large magnitude in relative terms) confirming that cognitive load
was successfully induced. The expected effects on behavior narrowly miss significance
for Phonological Load, and would have been significant in the absence of a statistical
correction due to the presence of a third treatment. This is consistent with the view
that reinforcement-based processes are highly automatic, and hence assumption (B2), on
which Theorem 2 rests, might be warranted in this case. However, the results are absent
for Central Executive Load, which suggests that strong-enough load manipulations have
the potential to alter the characteristics of even this kind of processes, with the result
that the conventionally-expected effects on behavior do not obtain.
7 General Discussion
Cognitive load is firmly established in psychology as a causal manipulation to study
reliance on more intuitive or more deliberative decision processes. As interest on the role
of intuition in decision making spread to economics, researchers started relying on this
manipulation with the expectation that the balance between intuition and deliberation
would be shifted toward the former under load, hence revealing fundamental components
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of economic preferences. However, the literature can be described as an accumulation
of mixed results, with some studies finding the expected shifts in behavior, and others
finding no effects. A particular problem is that, in the absence of behavioral effects as
predicted, it is not possible to say whether the shift toward intuition was not as expected,
or rather the cognitive load manipulation was simply unsuccessful.
In this paper, we offer an explanation of the mixed results in the literature and a pos-
sible avenue for improvement. Researchers should keep in mind that the more-cognitive
branches of psychology, which have found cognitive load to be a useful tool, typically
rely on simple, stylized tasks where the intuitive processes involved are quintessentially
automatic, in particular relying on very few or no cognitive resources. At the same time,
taxing cognitive resources in such simple tasks will often mechanically (and unsurpris-
ingly) produce longer response times as decision makers conduct additional cognitive
operations during a main task.
None of this observations apply to the tasks typical of economics. In this field, tasks
are generally complex, and associated with relatively long response times. This has
several consequences. The first is that the differences between more intuitive and more
deliberative processes might be generally larger. In terms of response times, there is more
room for the differences to become noticeable. One of the fundamental characteristics
of more intuitive processes is that they are faster on average than more deliberative
ones. Thus, if cognitive load shifts the balance toward more intuitive processes, it must
also reduce observable response times. This is the content of our Theorem 1, which
offers a straightforward manipulation check for cognitive load: response times must be
shorter under (successfully-induced) load than in its absence. Somewhat paradoxically,
this effect is unlikely to occur in the classical domains of application of cognitive load,
as, in the latter, response times are too short and leave little room for the differences
between processes to offset mechanical effects.
The second consequence of the higher complexity associated with economic tasks is
that what economists typically consider “intuitive” will generally correspond to behav-
ioral rules and decision processes with significant cognitive components. Those rules are
likely to be “more automatic than” their deliberative alternatives, but unlikely to be
“purely automatic.” As a consequence, those processes will also be affected, possibly in
complex ways, by the reduction in the availability of cognitive resources accruing to cog-
nitive load manipulations. Our Theorem 2 shows formally that the conventional wisdom
that load induces more intuitive behavior does obtain, but rests on the additional as-
sumption that intuitive processes remain unaffected by load. The latter is likely to hold
in psychological domains of application where intuition corresponds to highly-automatic,
stimulus-response processes, but is also likely not to hold for at least part of the tasks
which are of interest to economists.
In a series of experiments (total N = 628), we have shown that different cognitive load
manipulations significantly reduced response times in several complex, economic decision
tasks. The latter include very different economic paradigms: behavior in Cournot oligop-
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olies, voting in committees under different methods, and belief-updating tasks. These
observations confirm the prediction of Theorem 1, and suggest that our response-time
test can be used as a manipulation check for cognitive load in economic tasks. Impor-
tantly, this test is independent of whether behavioral effects are found as predicted or
not, and hence allows to disentangle studies where cognitive load was not successfully
induced from those where the manipulation did work, but the effect of a shift in the
nature of decision processes was not as expected.
In our experiments, and even though we do know that our manipulations were suc-
cessfully induced, we find partial or no evidence for the conventional prediction that cog-
nitive load should result in more intuitive choices (more imitation, more sincere choices,
or more reinforcement-based decisions). We conclude that the additional assumption
that the more-intuitive processes involved in the decisions we study are unaffected by
load might be unwarranted.
As commented above, it is not surprising that previous work in psychology has not
reported a systematic shift in response times as the one we predict and find here, since
we target a different kind of tasks from the ones studied there. However, a handful of
studies have used cognitive load on relatively complex tasks and reported response times.
Whitney et al. (2008) analyzed the impact of cognitive load (memorizing a five-letter
string and recalling a specific letter) on framing effects in decisions under risk (choosing
between a gamble and a sure outcome). They report that response times decreased
significantly from 2, 950 ms without load to 2, 796 ms with this kind of phonological-loop
load. Gerhardt et al. (2016) investigated risk attitudes in a lottery-choice experiment
with cognitive load, employing a visuospatial-sketchpad load manipulation (memorizing
a dot pattern). They reported that response times decreased significantly from 3, 835 ms
without load to 3, 449 ms with load. Those papers did find behavioral effects of cognitive
load (less gambling and lower risk aversion, respectively). Both report the observed effect
on response times to be unexpected, and the authors speculate that participants might
have tried to speed up their decisions in order to maintain accuracy in the cognitive load
task. Although this speculation does not affect any of the conclusions in those works,
we offer a simpler explanation: the manipulations in those papers successfully shifted
the balance toward more intuitive processes, which are associated with shorter response
times, hence bringing overall observed response times down.
Nevertheless, one might speculate that the additional incentives provided in our
cognitive load manipulations might somehow have induced participants to consciously
speed up their decisions. This is unlikely, since, for example, we also observe the effect
in Experiment 7, where the cognitive load manipulations (repeating the word “and” or
generating random numbers aloud) were not incentivized. Also, Duffy et al. (2016) and
Duffy et al. (2020) conducted two different experiments contrasting high cognitive load
(remembering 6-digit sequences) with low load (instead of no load; remembering 1-digit
numbers), both of which were incentivized. They also found that high load resulted in
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faster decisions (in Duffy et al., 2020, 10.081 s under low load vs. 9.586 s under high
load), although the effect was unexpected in those studies.
In several of our experiments, the effect on response times is of a large magnitude
in relative terms (Experiments 1, 2, 4, 5, and 7 in case of conflict). In Experiment
3, the effect is only significant in case of conflict, and the magnitude is substantially
smaller than in Experiments 1–2, which used the same main task. The difference is that
Experiment 3 used a different load manipulation (adding up a previously-read single-
digit number with another, just-heard single digit). In Experiment 6, the effect is only
significant for one of the voting methods, and again its magnitude is substantially smaller
than in Experiments 4–5, which used the same main task. Again, the difference is that
Experiment 6 used a different cognitive load manipulation (remembering a dot pattern).
This suggests that the difference in response times, which we have proposed here as
a test, might potentially be used to develop a metric of the comparative strength of
different cognitive load manipulations.
Related to this, Experiment 7 offers an additional, potentially-interesting insight.
In this experiment, a manipulation targeting the phonological loop produces the pre-
dicted effects on response times in case of conflict, and also (although significance is
narrowly missed after corrections for multiple testing) the expected increase in intuitive,
reinforcement-based choices. However, the main task involves much shorter response
times than other experiments, especially in case of alignment. In the latter, we indeed
do not observe any effect on response times, possibly suggesting that the task is close to
the boundary of the domain of applicability of Theorem 1. In the same experiment, we
also employed a particularly strong manipulation focused on central executive functions,
which again yielded a reduction of response times, as predicted, but only in case of
conflict. However, the effects of this stronger manipulation on behavior were markedly
weaker (than those of phonological load). We argue that this is not paradoxical. The
intuitive process we focus on in Experiment 7, reinforcement, is relatively automatic,
but still rests on cognitive functions (associating success to decisions). A manipulation
which does not tax away cognitive resources inordinately will affect reinforcement to a
small extent, or not at all. A much stronger manipulation, in contrast, might affect
both the more deliberative and the reinforcement process, invalidating the necessary as-
sumptions behind the predicted behavioral effect. In particular, under central executive
load, decisions in the binary main task approach 50% for each option, suggesting random
behavior.
To summarize, in this paper we offer a warning on the risks of uncritically importing
even well-established techniques across disciplines. This is not to say that economists
interested in intuition and deliberation should abandon cognitive load. On the contrary,
the very first conclusion of our analysis is that economists have a new tool at their dis-
posal, allowing them to determine when a cognitive load manipulation has successfully
induced a shift in the nature of decision processes employed by experimental partici-
pants. At the same time, we warn that researchers should be aware of the fact that
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conventional wisdom on the behavioral effects of cognitive load rests on additional as-
sumptions on just how automatic the postulated intuitive processes are. Using cognitive
load to causally test the role of certain processes in economic decision making requires
a careful, prior analysis of the actual cognitive characteristics of those processes. If the
cognitive difference between the postulated more deliberative and more intuitive pro-
cesses is small or unclear, it is unwarranted to predict any behavioral effects. If the
research question involves heuristics or processes of a clearly-automatic nature, or there
are objective reasons to expect large differences (in cognitive terms) between the pro-
cesses at work, the researcher will be fully justified to invoke our Theorem 2 and expect
a shift toward more intuitive behavior. In this case, in addition, our Theorem 1 will
provide the researcher with a test to ensure that possible null effects are not due to a
failure in the manipulation.
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